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Is Turkey backsliding on global competitiveness and democracy amid its EU bid in limbo? 
John Taskinsoy a 





Turks have been around for thousands of years, who have established many states and empires in the 
“land of Turks” referring to Anatolia (Asia Minor) and the Eastern Thrace. The life of Turks, previously 
in the Altai Mountains of western Mongolia, commenced in the interior of Asia Minor when Seljuqs 
defeated the Byzantines at Manzikert in 1071 (Malazgirt in Turkish), which also meant the start of 
Turkification of Asia Minor. After the six century long reign of the Ottoman Empire (1299-1922), 
Turks were introduced to democracy when Mustafa Kemal abolished the Ottoman Empire in 
November 1922 by overthrowing Sultan Mehmet VI Vahdettin and established Turkish Republic on 
October 29, 1923 (The Grand National Assembly elected Mustafa Kemal as President in 1923). After 
the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (November 10, 1938), Turkey has constantly faced instability-
inflicting developments (i.e. coup d'état, coup by memorandum, failed coup attempts, lack of fiscal 
and structural reforms, political turmoil, ineffective coalition governments, social unrest, chronic 
deficits, and repeated economic, financial, and currency crises. Turkey’s remarkable economic and 
democratic performance (6% YoY GDP growth between 2002 and 2007) was halted by endogenous 
(increasingly dictatorial/authoritarian rule, dysfunctional politics, negative developments in the rule 
of law, human rights, basic fundamentals, and the Judiciary/legal system) and exogenous factors (the 
2008 global financial crisis originated in the U.S.; Cyprus’ veto chapter 15 of Turkey’s EU accession 
negotiations; prosecution, conviction, and sentencing of the U.S. pastor Andrew Brunson of terrorism 
charges for taking part in the 2016 failed coup attempt; Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 defense 
system; Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program; the U.S. imposed sanctions/tariffs on steel imports 
from Turkey; repeated attacks on Turkish lira and the subsequent currency crisis). 
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Geopolitical risks and related diplomatic tensions were on the rise for Turkey prior to the 2008 global 
financial crisis (GFC). In December 2006, the EU suspended the opening of eight chapters on Customs 
Union and said that the negotiations would only resume if Turkey opened its ports (sea and air) to 
Greek-Cypriot traffic. Turkey-Cyprus relations became severely strained when France1 and Cyprus 
have unilaterally blocked other chapters, and in December 2009, Cyprus vetoed chapter 15 related to 
energy.2 Previously, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had been highly praised by 
the leaders of Muslim nations in the Middle East, Asia and Africa; however, international politics have 
changed quickly since the historic moment when Prime Minister Erdoğan walked off the stage at the 
2009 Davos summit over clash in Gaza and accused Israeli3 President Shimon Peres and his country 
for engaging in inhumane treatment of Palestinians and killing their women and children.4 
Turkey has been a devoted client of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since March 1947, but the 
first standby agreement was signed in January 1961 subsequent the 1960 military coup (Ismihan et 
al., 2005). After a total of 19 standby agreements, President Erdoğan feels that Turkey has graduated 
from the IMF when his government paid off the entirety of its debt to the IMF in 2013. In various 
speeches, Erdoğan has often stated publicly that “No IMF in Turkey’s future” and “IMF chapter will 
not be reopened” (Eken & Schadler, 2012), but this hardly reflects Turkey’s severe financial problems 
and the ensuing gloomy economic situation. Economists, scholars, and industry participants contend 
that Turkey’s divorce from the IMF can qualify as a graduation since the country is on the brink of an 
economic crisis (i.e. financial collapse), attributable to excessive private and household debt, a failed 
coup (July 15, 2016) by a fraction of the Turkish army, massive dollarization, rising unemployment, 
the August rout (2018), a spike in corporate defaults, and coronavirus pandemic.5 Erdogan put an end 
to the IMF debate by saying Turkey is “far from needing” a bailout package from the IMF. 
                                                             
1 France taking part in the Cyprus matter angered Ankara because France is not even one of the three guarantors; Greece, 
Turkey and England. On the Cyprus island, there are currently two countries; the Republic of Cyprus was established in 
1960 (EU member since 2004), and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) which was established in 1983 after 
the Turkish military intervened on the island in 1974 to protect its citizens and the island is divided since then.   
2 In 1959, Turkey applied to become a member of the then European Economic Community (EEC), and in 1963, Turkey was 
accepted to become an associate member. In 1987 (after Spain joined the ECC in 1986), Turkey applied for full membership 
and almost a decade later (in 1996), Turkey as the first non-EU country joined the Customs Union with the EU. However, 
at the 1997 Luxembourg summit, Turkey was not placed among the 10 countries to join the EU in May 2004 and 2 more 
in 2007. Although the EU decision on Turkey was reversed at the 1999 Helsinki summit, just before the 2007 date, the EU 
suspended opening new chapters and closing opened chapters until Turkey opened its ports to Greek-Cypriot traffic.       
3 Ironically, Turkey was the first Muslim nation to recognize Israel as a sovereign state in 1949, but kept its distance due to 
Turkey’s cultural ties with the Arab world; the 1956 Arab-Israeli war; Israel’s declaration of Jerusalem as its capital in 
1980; the Jenin refugee camp incident in April 2002; Iraq war in 2003; the attacking of Turkish-owned Mavi Marmara (May 
31, 2010) by Israeli navy commandos; and Turkey’s gas exploration and drilling in the Mediterranean. 
4 For a longer perspective and detailed discussions on this topic and other related topics, interested readers are welcome to 
check out Taskinsoy (2012; 2013; 2018; 2019; 2020). 
5 Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/7c9d9851-58cf-4561-9e8e-24dca0e6866e 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3648210
3 
 
Before the coronavirus pandemic and the Fed induced Great Panic, a massive financial tsunami hit 
the Turkish economy in August 2018, the most severe shock since Turkey’s economic crisis in 2001 
(i.e. prior to and during the crisis, Turkey received over $30 billion of financial assistance from the 
IMF). Without the IMF loans, many are skeptic that Turkey will never fully recover from the lasting 
after-effects of the August rout, underpinned by strong dollarization (see Figure 1), mounting external 
debt (i.e. over $430 billion at the end of 2019, $169 billion of that is in short-term), extremely low net 
reserves (i.e. less than $30 billion in April 2020), and the unthinkable cost of the coronavirus crisis 
(up to $50 billion); all of these factors (i.e. mounting geopolitical tensions, potential second or third 
wave of COVID-19 insurgence) make Turkish economy more crisis-prone. President Erdoğan says the 




Source: Turkish central bank (TCMB); https://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/en/tcmb+en 
Figure 1: Turkey’s short-term external debt and dollarization ($ billion) 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3648210
4 
 
2.0 Literature Review 
Along with the Greek and the Chinese, Turks6 have been around for at least four thousand years; first 
lived as nomadic people in Central Asia (i.e. Göktürk Empire united the nomadic Turkic tribes during 
552-745), then established various states and empires when Turks (Seljuqs) defeated the Byzantines 
at Manzikert in 1071, opening the gates of Asia Minor (modern Turkey) to Turks during the medieval 
period (Jackson, 2002; Inalcik & Quataert, 1995). The Seljuqs era ended by Mongols’ repeated attacks 
(1243 onward); Osman I (the tribal leader) emerged as prince (“bey” in Turkish) when he took over 
an area in northwestern Anatolia (present Turkish city “Bursa”) from the Byzantine, and founded the 
Ottoman Empire7 in 1299 (see Shaw & Shaw, 1977; Kunt & Woodhead, 1995; Kinross, 1977; Inalcik 
& Quataert, 1995). The Ottoman Empire lasted 623 years (1299-1922); Istanbul’s conquest in 1453 
by Mehmed II – Mehmed the Conqueror (Turkish: Fatih Sultan Mehmet), changed history. During the 
reign of his grandson Suleiman I (1520-66) – Suleiman the Magnificent, the Ottoman Empire became 
the most powerful in the world ruling 25 million people from Hungary to Yemen; however with the 
Crimean War (1853-56), financially drained Empire entered the age of collapse and going into WWI 
on the side of Germany was a fatal decision that brought the Empire’s inevitable demise (see Aksakal, 
2008; Aksan, 2007; Barkey, 2008; Findley, 2004; Pamuk, 1987; Schaller & Zimmerer, 2008). 
The modern era of the Turkish history began in 1923 with the direction of one brilliant man, soldier, 
politician, strategist, and genius - Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk)8; at the time, there was only one university 
called Darülfünun9 inherited from the Ottoman Empire, no own bank (Birdal, 2010; Blaisdell, 1929) 
and no means of production of even the most basic things10 (Ahmad, 1993; Altug et al., 2008). 
                                                             
6 The name Turkey comes from the Latin word “Turchia” which translates to "land of the Turks".  
7 The history of the Ottoman Empire is divided into four distinct periods; (1) the age of territorial expansion (1300 – 1481) 
and restoration (1402-1481); (2) the age of power at its peak (1481 – 1566); (3) the age of decline (1566 – 1807); and (4) 
the age of collapse and dissolution (1807 – 1922). 
8 Atatürk (1981-1939), the greatest leader ever, introduced countless very important reforms to guide Turkey to become 
westernized. These reforms later became laws, which included: family name law; dress law (not using the traditional hat 
called fez, using modern Western type of hats); use of Turkish alphabet law (Latin alphabet); a law introduced new courts 
similar to those in Switzerland and Italy and closed down the existing Islamic courthouses. First time in Turkish history or 
the Ottoman history, Atatürk gave women unprecedented rights never seen before, and he said that ‘’Humankind is made 
up of two sexes, women and men. Is it possible for humankind to grow by the improvement of only one part while the 
other part is ignored? Is it possible that if half of a mass is tied to earth with chains that the other half can soar into skies?”     
9 In July of 1933, based on Professor Malche’s findings, the Turkish Parliament abolished Darülfünun and created the Turkish 
Republic’s first university called Istanbul University which also marked a special time in history that the word ‘university’ 
was actually used in the Turkish language for the first time. 
10 The 1970s were especially hard times for the students in Turkey; political insatiability led to economic turmoil and created 
enormous violence due to constant clashes between members of the right-wing/left-wing and the armed forces (police 
and all branches of the military). In these challenging years, Turkey was divided into several political camps and students 
in higher education were heavily targeted and recruited to join these different political camps either by choice or by force. 
The tertiary education institutions throughout the country on a daily basis were under constant threat of attacks or bomb 
plots. As the unstoppable violence and social unrest kept rising, so did the death toll (estimated 5000 people were killed); 
the General Kenan Evren (the commander-in-chief), decided to take control and end the violence on September 12, 1980 
which marked the third coup since the establishment of the Turkish Republic (1960, 1971, and 1980). 
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1854 3,000,000 80.00 2,280,000 76.00 6.0 7.9 Crimean War Britain 
1855 5,000,000 102.6 5,130,000 102.00 4.0 3.9 Crimean War Britain 
1858 5,000,000 76.00 3,680,000 74.00 6.0 8.1 Support exchange rate Britain 
1860 2,000,000 62.50 1,270,000 62.00 6.0 9.6 Budget deficit France 
1862 8,000,000 68.00 5,440,000 68.00 6.0 8.8 Withdrawal of kaimes Britain 
1863 8,000,000 71.00 5,680,000 71.00 6.0 8.5 Repayment of debt France 
1865/1 6,000,000 66.00 3,960,000 66.00 6.0 9.1 Repayment of debt and deficit France 
1865/2 36,000,000 50.00 18,180,000 50.00 5.0 10.0 Repayment of 1854 loan France, Britain 
1869 22,200,000 54.00 12,000,000 54.00 6.0 11.1 Repayment of debt and deficit France 
1870 31,700,000 32.13 10,180,000 32.00 3.0 9.3 Rumeli Railway Austria, Germany, Italy 
1871 5,700,000 73.00 4,160,000 73.00 6.0 8.2 Budget deficit Britain, France 
1872 11,200,000 98.50 9,460,000 85.00 9.0 10.6 Budget deficit Britain, Austria, Germany 
1873/1 11,400,000 55.00 6,300,000 55.00 5.0 9.1 Consolidation of 1872 bonds France, Britain 
1973/2 27,800,000 54.00 15,000,000 54.00 6.0 11.1 Budget deficit France 
1874 40,000,000 43.50 17,400,000 43.00 5.0 11.5 Floating debt France, Britain 
1877 5,000,000 52.00 2,600,000 52.00 5.0 9.6 Finance 1877 Russian War France 
Total 228,000,000 64.89 122,720,000 63.56 5.63 9.15 Red color indicates figures are averaged 
Source: Birdal (2010); calculations by the author 
Notes: In 1860, the Ottoman Empire tried to raise a loan of £16,000,000 at 14% interest rate through the underwriter French banker Jules Mirès, but this attempt 
failed because the French government did not allow it to be quoted in the French stock market; as a result, Mirès was not able to get enough investors to invest With 
the death of the Sultan Abdülmecid in 1861, the brother Sultan Abdülaziz as successor and hıs government was able to secure a fresh loan of £8,000,000 in 1862. 
Things were turning positive for a change, Sultan Abdülaziz’s Imperial Ottoman Bank took advantage of the returned investors’ confidence to broker two new loans; 
£8,000,000 at 6% (1863) and £6,000,000 at 6%. The Ottoman Empire’s indebtedness increased beyond control; during 1854-61, Sultan Abdülmecid agreed on loans 
totaling £15,000,000 (drawn £12,360,000). Sultan Abdülaziz, about the same time span as his brother (from 1862 to 1870), agreed on loans reaching £112,000,000. 
In the first ten-year period (1854 to 1863), the Ottoman Empire barrowed from external sources a total of £31,000,000 (circa £2,000,000 of interest payment per 
annum); in the second eight-year period (1865 to 1872), with £112,000,000 the level of barrowing skyrocketed (i.e. five times more than the estimated £22,000,000 
of annual revenues). The last spree of the Ottoman’s barrowing before bankruptcy (1873 to 1877) climaxed, in just five years,  the Empire secured loans stood at 
£84,000,000 (again four years’ worth of tax and customs revenues were used to pay these massive loans). From 1865 to 1877 (13  years), the Ottoman Empire paid 
over £20,000,000 for interest expense. The Ottoman Empire was not able to survive under the heavy financial burden of the massive loans it contracted between 1854 
and 1874; as a result, the Ottoman Empire financially collapsed (bankrupt) in October 1876. The war with Serbia and Montenegro in 1876 and with Russia in 1877 
pulled plug on the Ottoman Empire; the ill man as Europeans called went into coma just prior to World War I (1914-18). Because the Ottoman Empire was not able 
to pay its outstanding external debt, creditors agreed to reduce the Ottoman’s debt almost by 50%, from £228,000,000 to £128,000,000 (see Eldem, 2005).  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3648210
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The Ottoman Empire existed without a bank for over 600 years, foreign capital flowed via the Galata 
Bankers who were Greeks, Jews, and Armenians. Not only these bankers enjoyed 15% to 20% interest 
charged on short-term advances, but had extensive influence on Sultans; therefore, Europeans coined 
the term “Galata Vampires” since these bankers earned returns like sucking the blood of their clients 
(Birdal, 2010; Hulkiender, 2003; Kazgan, 1991). As illustrated in Table 1, these small types of banking 
operations were seen as utterly insufficient and inadequate to finance the Empire’s ambitious efforts 
of modernization (Anderson, 1964; Blaisdell, 1929; Rodkey, 1930). In 1878 at the Congress of Berlin, 
France and Britain took control of the Ottoman debt which was halved through negotiations since the 
Empire was unable to pay even interest payments of the debt. Consequently, Sultan Abdülhamid II 
was forced to create the OPDA11 in 1881 in order to administer war reparations and the Empire’s 
outstanding foreign debt stock (Blaisdell, 1929; Guran, 2003; Kıray, 1995). 
 
Table 2: Economic indicators of Turkey 
 1880 1913 1929 1950 1980 2005 
Population (million) 13 17 14 21 45 69 
Share of urban population (%) 26 28 24 25 44 68 
Share of agriculture in labor (%) 80 80 85 84 51 34 
Share of agriculture in GDP (%) 54 55 42 54 26 11 
GDP per capita a ($) 850 1200 710 1620 4020 7500 
-as % of W. Europe plus U.S. 37 29 16 24 25 30 
-as % of developing countries 147 168 --- 188 219 225 
-as % of world 81 79 --- 77 89 117 
Life expectancy (years) --- 30 --- 48 62 69 
Literacy age 15+ (%) --- 10 --- 32 69 89 
Periods 1880-13 1914-29 1930-49 1950-79 1980-05 2005-25 
Annual population growth (%) 0.8 -1.1 1.8 2.6 1.7 1.9 
Annual GDP per capita growth (%) 0.8 0.0 3.1 3.1 2.5 2.9 
Source: Altug et al. (2008); a PPP adjusted in 1990 $USD  
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s Turkey started way behind in the race of global competitiveness12 (as shown 
in Table 2, no skilled labor force, low literacy and high mortality); at this background, he was unable 
to develop an autonomous economic strategy. The vestiges of the Ottoman Empire and the treaties 
signed in the post-WWI with harsh terms13 forced Turkey to accept the Ottoman Empire’s outstanding 
debt at a reduced rate; as such, 62% of the pre-1912 debt and 77% of the post-1912 debt14 (Caillard, 
                                                             
11 OPDA (similar to the IMF) refers to the Ottoman Public Debt Administration. 
12 Atatürk realized that any type of factory to produce goods had to build by the government due to lack of skilled labor, 
resources, and potential investors; therefore, any sort of production was done by state-owned enterprises. 
13 The Armistice of Mudros (October 30, 1918) was followed by the Treaty of Sèvres (August 10, 1920) which had the utmost 
objective of liquidating the Ottoman Empire and abolishing Turkish sovereignty, but it failed and was replaced by the 
Treaty of Lausanne (July 24, 1923); Turkey gave up Arab provinces, Cyprus, and Dodecanese, plus the Aegean Sea and the 
Black Sea were declared open to all shipping. 
14 Turkey made its final debt payment on 25 May 1954. 
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1885; Çakır, 2001; Conte, 2014; Eldem, 1994). Atatürk’s ambition to develop an economic policy was 
interrupted by the Great Depression of the 1930s, but he still put together a five-year plan comprising 
many government-initiative projects (Keynes, 1936)15 such as building railroads, setting up factories, 
establishing higher education institutions, and creating a central bank (Ahmad, 1993; Findley, 2004; 
Mango, 2000; Kedourie, 1989; Nas, 1992; Zurcher, 2004; Webster, 1939). 
Atatürk observed how the Ottoman Empire struggled financially because it had no national banks16; 
as a result, its economy was besieged by heavy borrowings from France and England that ultimately 
put a tight leash on sultans (Blaisdell, 1929; Birdal, 2010; Caillard, 1894; Eken & Schadler, 2012; Önis, 
2009; Eldem, 2005; Findley, 1986; Rustow, 1987). Even then, Atatürk knew it perfectly that Turkey’s 
forward progress would be possible with the help of a national banking system not only capable of 
serving the young country’s extensive and challenging financial needs, but enabling and fostering the 
development of crucial industries. For this exact reason, Atatürk wanted to create a true national bank 
to finance various domestic infrastructure projects; İş Bank, founded in August 1924, assumed this 
enormous task. Ziraat Bank17 (Agricultural Bank) primarily focused on serving the financial needs of 
farmers who are still a significant part of the Turkish economy (e.g. Marois & Güngen, 2016).18 Atatürk 
also ordered the name of the Imperial Ottoman Bank to be changed back to the Ottoman Bank and 
allowed it to remain as a state-owned bank with limited central bank functions until 1931 (Turkey’s 
central bank was finally created in June 1930 but began its operation on October 3, 1931).19 
Almost a century after its creation, still whether Turkey’s central bank (TCMB) is independent or it is 
acting under pressure is a hotly debated topic. The truth is, TCBM has never been independent (i.e. 
maybe briefly after 2001); President Erdogan’s sacking of central bank governor Murat Cetinkaya on 
6 July 2019 sent a strong signal, removing all doubts that TCMB was independent as long as the signals 
given by the executive presidency were included in monetary policy decisions. With Turkish economy 
bent to the president’s will, and with TCMB’s increasingly shaky monetary policy credibility, all risks 
(endogenous, exogenous, geopolitical and COVID-19 related) are tilted downside. 
                                                             
15 Monetarists like the influential British economist John Maynard Keynes argues in favor of government intervention during 
challenging economic times because sovereign states have resources large enough to create economic activity.  
16 The Ottoman Empire never borrowed money from other nations until the Crimean War (1853-56); paper banknotes 
(Kaime) were printed in 1840, which later became worthless due to hyperinflation. For the repayment of war reparations 
and the Empire’s outstanding external debts, Ottoman Bank (Ottoman Turkish: Bank-ı Osmanî) was established in 1856 
with British capital and was headquartered in London. In 1863, the Ottoman Bank was restructured under the name of 
Imperial Ottoman Bank which was established by the Ottoman Empire in partnership with English-French financiers; the 
bank served as the Empire’s Treasury with central bank functions. 
17 The Homeland Funds was established in 1863, the name of which was changed to Ziraat Bank in 1888  
18 Establishment of other important state-owned banks; Halkbank (May 23, 1938), Vakif Bank (January 11, 1954). 
19 Atatürk initiated the establishment of a couple more new banks into the country’s growing financial system; Sümerbank 
in 1932 and Etibank in 1935. Before the start of World War II, Atatürk’s reforms helped Turkey create a financial sector 
of its own that provided necessary financial means to develop other vital industries. 
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2.1 Backsliding on Competitiveness 
Since Mustafa Kemal Atatürk created the Republic of Turkey20 from the ashes of an ill-Ottoman 
Empire, Turkey’s economic progress has been robust (GDP 6% or more); however, its impressive 
performance has been disrupted by repeated military coups, chronic deficits, economic/financial 
crises, political turmoil arising from a confluence of domestic and external developments, and now 
the extraordinary cost impact of the Great Lockdown due to the devastating COVID-19 pandemic, 
which could potentially toss Turkey out of the G20 group as Turkey’s GDP is forecast to contract at 
least 3% in 2020 (i.e. $650 billion) – currently 20th (dropped 3 positions since 2016, see Table 3). 
 
Table 3: G20 countries 
Rank Country Last Previous Date Unit 
1 United States 21200 20544 Dec/19 USD Billion 
2 China 14200 13608 Dec/19 USD Billion 
3 Euro Area 14000 13670 Dec/19 USD Billion 
4 Japan 5110 4971 Dec/19 USD Billion 
5 Germany 4040 3997 Dec/19 USD Billion 
6 United Kingdom 2910 2855 Dec/19 USD Billion 
7 France 2890 2778 Dec/19 USD Billion 
8 India 2800 2719 Dec/19 USD Billion 
9 Italy 2030 2074 Dec/19 USD Billion 
10 Brazil 2020 1869 Dec/19 USD Billion 
11 Russia 1750 1658 Dec/19 USD Billion 
12 Canada 1740 1709 Dec/19 USD Billion 
13 South Korea 1690 1619 Dec/19 USD Billion 
14 Spain 1460 1426 Dec/19 USD Billion 
15 Australia 1450 1432 Dec/19 USD Billion 
16 Mexico 1200 1221 Dec/19 USD Billion 
17 Indonesia 1126 1042 Dec/19 USD Billion 
18 Netherlands 951 913 Dec/19 USD Billion 
19 Saudi Arabia 785 782 Dec/19 USD Billion 
20 Turkey                  ↓ 740 767 Dec/19 USD Billion 
21 Switzerland        ↑ 715 706 Dec/19 USD Billion 
Source: Trading Economics; https://tradingeconomics.com/country-list/gdp?continent=g20 
Like President Erdoğan, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes in the 1960s argued that the IMF wanted to 
put a rein (a leash) on Turkish government by making international borrowing scarce and costly. The 
IMF opposition gained popularity with Turkish voters who helped Menderes’ party win the elections 
in 1954 and 1958; paradoxically, the partially accepted IMF program in 1958 also brought the DP’s 
                                                             
20 Mustafa Kemal’s well-organized resistance army was victorious in the War of Independence (1919-1923). Subsequently, 
armies of Allied forces were expelled from the occupied Turkish land; Mustafa Kemal famously said “they will go as they 
came”; he abolished the Ottoman Empire in 1922 by overthrowing Sultan Mehmet VI Vahdettin and established Turkish 
Republic on October 29, 1923. Mustafa Kemal was elected as the first President in 1923 and the Grand National Assembly 
of Turkey (TBMM) honored him with the title (last name) Atatürk in 1934 which means the “Father of the Turks”. 
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demise21 and the subsequent military coup on May 27, 1960 (see Conway, 2007; Joyce, 2006; Singer, 
1977). There were four more military interventions, in 1971, 1980, 1997, and 2016 but the latter two 
were different from the former three. The coup of 1997 was called a “soft coup” because the Turkish 
military did not take full control of the government, instead put immense pressure on Prime Minister 
Necmettin Erbakan and his party to resign, the closure of which paved the road for the establishment 
of the current ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2001. The failed coup in 2016 was called 
“an attempt” because it was not a full-fledged military takeover, mainly an uncoordinated (sloppy) 
act by a fraction of military forces that did not follow a complete (top-to-bottom) chain of command. 
Every decade starting with the 1960s had extraordinary events that forced Turkey to go backward 
for a decade or two in terms of economic and social development performance (Table 4).  
 







GDP Per Capita 
$ 
GDP P.C. Annual 
Growth % 
2019 771,274 0.9 2019 8,958 -4.75 
2018 771,400 2.8 2018 9,405 -10.9 
2017 852,648 7.5 2017 10,551 -2.5 
2016 863,390 3.2 2016 10,817 -0.9 
2015 859,449 6.1 2015 10,915 -9.2 
2014 934,075 5.2 2014 12,022 -3.0 
2013 950,328 8.5 2013 12,395 7.3 
2012 873,696 4.8 2012 11,553 3.7 
2011 832,497 11.1 2011 11,141 6.4 
2010 772,290 8.5 2010 10,476 17.9 
2009 644,470 -4.7 2009 8,882 -16.9 
2008 764,643 0.8 2008 10,692 11.8 
2007 675,010 5.0 2007 9,563 21.1 
2006 550,796 7.1 2006 7,899 8.5 
2005 501,163 9.0 2005 7,278 22.3 
2004 404,853 9.6 2004 5,953 28.2 
2003 311,944 5.6 2003 4,643 29.4 
2002 238,342 6.4 2002 3,589 17.6 
2001 200,305 -6.0 2001 3,053 -27.6 
2000 273,085 6.6 2000 4,219 5.0 
1999 256,485 -3.4 1999 4,019 -8.4 
1998 276,012 4.6 1998 4,387 4.0 
1997 261,775 7.5 1997 4,221 3.1 
1996 250,263 7.0 1996 4,096 5.6 
1995 233,340 7.2 1995 3,877 28.2 
1994 179,208 -5.5 1994 3,024 -29.0 
Source: Countryeconomy.com; https://countryeconomy.com/gdp/turkey 
                                                             
21 Following the May 27, 1960 military coup, both President Celal Bayar and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes were arrested 
and found guilty by the military court. Celal Bayar, longest lived state leader (1883-1986), was Prime Minister (1937-39) 
and President (1950-60) was sentenced to life imprisonment, but he was released in 1964 due to poor health and pardoned 
in 1966. Unfortunately, Prime Minister Menderes was not as lucky, who was sentenced to death by hanging. Menderes did 
not do anything wrong or unlawful to deserve the death penalty. Many years later, the Turkish government apologized for 
its shameful decision, regardless murdering its prime minister by hanging remains as one of the darkest days in history. 
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Turkey’s economic performance since its most severe economic crisis of 2001 has been remarkable; 
this impressive record in part was attributable to the non-coalition government under the Justice and 
Development Party that has won 16 elections since 2002 (President Erdoğan is a founding member), 
ambitious structural and fiscal reforms, accommodative external environment (i.e. dollar glut due to 
the Fed’s expansive monetary policy along with the historically low interest rates in the U.S.), EU-
accession negotiations, and the AKP’s fruitful economic stimulus programs (see Önis, 2009; Raina & 
Bakker, 2003). However, adverse effects of the influx of about 4.5 million refugees (i.e. 3.6 million 
from Syria), growing economic vulnerabilities arose from increased tensions between the U.S. and 
Turkey, and the currency crisis in August 2018 contributed to the AKP’s stinging defeats in the 2019 
mayoral elections; consequently, for first time since the local elections of 27 March 1994 (Erdoğan 
was elected Mayor of Istanbul), the opposition party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP) won Istanbul.  
A deluge of monetary and fiscal reforms between 2002 and 2009 have fueled a broad rally in Turkish 
economy; however, in the past few years (since 2013), exogenous (hostile external environment) and 
endogenous (deficits and political turmoil) risks reversed two decades of progress made to date.22 
For example, the GDP per capita in Turkey has dropped for six consecutive years, from $12,395 (peak) 
in 2013 to $8,958 in 2019 (i.e. 2006 level); furthermore, the impact of the coronavirus crisis (i.e. Great 
Lockdown beginning in mid-March, i.e. 9 weeks of partial lockdowns enforced on the weekends and 
national holidays) will cause the Turkish economy to contract 3% or more in 2020 (downgraded from 
+3.9% growth); as a direct consequence of the AKP’s poor performance in GDP growth (Figure 3) and 
job creation (Figure 2), Turkish people are a lot poorer now than they were in 2013.  
 
 
Source: World Bank; http://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/ 
Figure 2: Turkey unemployment rates (2012-2018) 
                                                             
22 https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/turkey/overview 
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Turkey’s risk premia has risen rapidly following the 2016 failed military coup attempt and climaxed 
in the aftermath of the currency shock in August 2018, the amplified risk premia severely impacted 
every area in Turkish economy which has been on a roller-coaster ride in terms of interest rates and 
inflation. In October 2018 (Figure 4), core inflation (CPI) hit 25% while producer price index reached 
50%; similarly, interest rates hit the roof; 36% for commercial loans, 28% for housing loans, and as 
high as 24% for bank deposits in lira. After several rigorous monetary easing actions by the Turkish 
central bank (TCMB), the policy rate was cut from 24% in June 2019 to 8.75% in April 2020; same 
way, the core inflation declined to 8.6% in October 2019 after peaking at 25% a year ago, however 




Source: World Bank; https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/turkey/gdp-per-capita 
Figure 3: Turkey real GDP (%) and GDP per capita ($)  




A. Consumer Price Index (CPI) – Annual Change (%) B. Producer Price Index (PPI) – Annual Change (%) 
  
C. Resident’s FX Deposits with Banks (Billion $) D. International Investment Position (Billion $) 
  
E. Short-Term External Debt Statistics (Billion $)   F. Interest Rates for Banks’ Loans and Deposits (%) 
Source: TCMB – Turkish Republic Central Bank 
https://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/EN/TCMB+EN/Main+Menu/Statistics/Chart+Gallery 
Figure 4: Various economic indicators of Turkish economy 
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During a century of history as an independent state following Ottoman Empire’s dissolution (1299-
1922), the Republic of Turkey (since 1923) has endured many obstacles, challenges, and paradigm-
shifting crises that often led to a military coup or vice versa (Table 5, also see Figure 3and 4). 
 
Table 5: Turkish history of unprecedented events 
Event Economic/Social Developments Outcomes 
1 
Severe economic recession; socio-political turmoil; American 
aid ran out, Marshall Plan ended and Prime Minister Adnan 
Menderes approached Moscow for lines of credit; May 27, 
1960 the Turkish armed forces took control (coup); president 
(Celal Bayar) and prime minister Adnan Menderes among 
others were arrested and prosecuted for charges of high 
treason; Celal Bayar was sentenced to life imprisonment and 
Adnan Menderes was sentenced to death by hanging.  
Economic recession, violence, instability; 
military coup on May 27, 1960; prime 
minister Adnan Menderes was executed 
by hanging (Sept. 16, 1961); IMF stand-by 
program was signed in 1961; on July, 1961 
constitutional referendum was held which 
replaced one from 1924; two failed coup 
attempts in 1962 and 1963. 
2 
The extreme Islamist movement turned into a state of chaos In 
the early 1970s; public disorder and political terrorism grew 
substantially; the Chief of Turkish Armed Forces handed prime 
minister Süleyman Demirel a memorandum (March 12, 1971) 
known as ‘coup by memorandum’; ongoing and severe clashes 
between left-wing and right-wing groups who often carried 
out bombing attacks and violent acts; the extreme Islamist 
movement rejected Atatürk and his principles. 
Socio-political turmoil grew in the 1970s; 
Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel's Justice 
Party lost parliamentary majority as some 
members defected to form own groups; a 
new wave of terror led to martial law and 
repression; the military memorandum of 
1971 ousted prime minister Demirel and 
set the stage for another coup in 1980. 
3 
Süleyman Demirel succeeded Bülent Ecevit as prime minister 
in 1975 formed a coalition government (4 different parties); 
amplified economic/social problems and the ensuing extreme 
violence in the late 1970s; The 1980 coup d'état was welcome 
to restore order and stop the ongoing socio-political violence 
since the 1960s; National Security Council was in charge of the 
government from 1980 to the 183 general election;     
The 1980 coup (September 12) overthrew 
the government and issued a martial law; 
all political parties and trade unions were 
banned; the constitution was suspended; 
the economy was on the verge of collapse, 
high unemployment, deficits, and inflation, 
but improved in second half of the 1980s. 
4 
Negative impacts of the 1991 Persian Gulf War and embargos 
placed by the UN cost the Turkish economy between $3 and $5 
billion; favorable ratings by the US credit rating agencies in 
1992 and 1993; short-term debt increased significantly which 
caused a huge rise in dollarization; the government requested 
about $1 billion from the IMF; unresolved economic problems 
resulted in a currency crisis. 
Unresolved economic problems, political 
turmoil, social unrest, and ineffectiveness 
of the coalition government, (Tansu Çiller 
was Prime Minister, 1993–1996) led to the 
1997 military memorandum (28 February 
also called ‘Post-modern coup’). Erbakan’s 
Welfare Party was closed.   
5 
Political instability increased immensely after the 1997 post-
modern coup; the massive Marmara earthquake in 1999 only 
made the matter worse (over 18,000 people died); Prime 
Minister Ecevit, after meeting with President Nejdet Sezer, 
characterized the meeting as “a serious crisis” this prompted a 
panic-induced heavy sell-off in stock market.  
The economic crisis of 2001 was the worst 
in Turkish history (GDP contracted 6%); 
central bank’s foreign reserves declined by 
$5 billion; several banks became insolvent 
or bailed out; Turkish lira depreciated at 
least 50%; 15,000-20,000 jobs were lost.   
6 
Turkey’s remarkable economic performance since 2002 (6% 
YoY GDP growth) was halted by the 2008 global financial crisis 
originated in the U.S.; President Erdogan’s remarks at the 2009 
Davos and his repeated criticism of the IMF had a straining 
effect on Turkey’s relations with its neighboring countries.    
Severe recession; augmented geopolitical 
risks caused a huge fall in foreign demand; 
unemployment rate rose by 5%; industrial 
production fell about 50% and the GDP 
contracted by -4.7% (worst since 2001).  
7 
Strained Turkey-Cyprus relations as Cyprus vetoed chapter 15 
of Turkey’s EU accession negotiations; conviction of the U.S. 
pastor Andrew Brunson of terrorism charges and taking part 
in the 2016 failed coup attempt; Turkey’s purchase of Russian 
S-400 defense system; removal of Turkey from F-35 program.  
The U.S. imposed sanctions/tariffs on steel 
imports from Turkey; repeated attacks on 
Turkish lira resulted in a severe currency 
crisis; the value of lira plummeted against 
the dollar (see Figure 4 on next page).   
Source: Author 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3648210
14 
 
2.2 Backsliding on Democracy 
Turks23 have been around for 4000 years, who established many states and empires24 in the “land of 
Turks” referring to Anatolia (Asia Minor) and Eastern Thrace (European part of Turkey)25. However, 
the key elements of democracy has been arcane to Turks until Mustafa Kemal (a brilliant man, superb 
military commander, genius, and envied politician/president) ended over six centuries-long Ottoman 
rule. His well-organized resistance army was victorious in the War of Independence (1919-1923), the 
armies of Allied forces were expelled; subsequently, Mustafa Kemal abolished the Ottoman Empire in 
November 192226 by overthrowing Sultan Mehmet VI Vahdettin and established Turkish Republic on 
October 29, 1923 (The Grand National Assembly elected Mustafa Kemal as President in 1923).27 
The life of Turks, previously in the Altai Mountains of western Mongolia, commenced in the interior 
of Asia Minor (modern Turkey) when Seljuqs defeated the Byzantines at Manzikert in 1071 (Malazgirt 
in Turkish), which also meant the start of Turkification of Asia Minor. The successor Ottomans (tribal 
leader and founder Osman I) established the Ottoman Empire (1299-1922) that conquered lands in 
Southeastern Europe, Central Europe, Western Asia, and Northern Africa.28 However, after 623 years 
of strict Ottoman rule, Turkey’s transition from sultanate to democracy in the 20th century was rather 
painful, underpinned by developments in the aftermath of Atatürk’s death (November 10, 1938); as 
such, chronic socio-political turmoil, repeated military interventions (coup d'état), and the spin-off 
crises (financial, economic, currency, and societal). Although not a full-fledged democracy, to start the 
process, Atatürk formed the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi - CHP in Turkish) in 
1923 which inaugurated the single-party era (e.g. Rustow, 1957; Harris, 1965). 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s closest associate Ismet Inönü became president after his death in 1938, but 
the timing could not have been any worse. Although Turkey stayed neutral, the outbreak of World 
War II (1939-45) triggered a surge in Turkey’s military spending which rose from 25% to 60% of the 
government budget. By the conclusion of WWII, Turkish economy was in severe recession; per capita 
income and agricultural output fell circa 30%, inflation skyrocketed (as high as 300%), and 80% of 
the Turkish lira’s value depreciated against major currencies during 1938-45 (see Altug et al., 2008; 
                                                             
23 Turkic refers to Turkish people, Azerbaijanis, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Turkmens, Kyrgyz and Uyghur people. 
24 The Great Hun Empire (370s-469), the Göktürk Empire (552- 740), the Uygur Empire (741- 840), the Avar Empire (600-
900), the Hazar Empire (500-1000), the Great Seljuk Empire (1040- 1157), and the Ottoman Empire (1299-1922). 
25 Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Turkey 
26 The Grand National Assembly of Turkey on 1 November 1922 ended the Ottoman Empire, which was recognized on 11 
November 1922 at the Conference of Lausanne. 
27 The last sultan, Mehmed VI Vahdettin (reigned 1918–22), was forced to leave the country on 17 November 1922. 
28 Countries that were once under the Ottoman rule. Bulgaria, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel and the 
Palestinian territories, Macedonia, Romania, Syria, parts of Arabia, the north coast and the horn of Africa.  
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Boratav, 2009). Economic problems of the war years and the capital levy29 introduced by the Inönü 
administration to raise money to meet the country’s debt obligations took a heavy toll on his political 
career prospects (Akın, 2002; Albayrak, 2004; Kibritçioğlu, 2001; Nas, 2008). Consequently, the CHP’s 
single-party dominance30 took a major blow in the 1946 general election; Democrat Party (DP) also 
founded in 1945 won 61 seats (e.g. Karpat, 1959; Weiker, 1975), but the transition into a multi-party 
political system commenced strongly when the DP won 396 out of 487 seats (i.e. claimed 54% of the 
votes) in the 195031 general election; Celal Bayar32 became President and Adnan Menderes became 
Prime Minister (Lipovsky, 1991; Szyliowicz, 1966; Schick & Tonak, 1987; Özbudun, 1976).33 However, 
Menderes and his party became the target of international aggression campaign as he rejected the 
IMF’s politically motivated policy advice and accused the IMF for its recidivism and contractionary 
measures (Bas & Stone, 2010; Bird et al., 2004; Conway, 2007; Joyce, 2006; Singer, 1977).34 
September 16, 1961 was the darkest and most shameful day in Turkey’s young history of transition 
to democracy; following the 1960 coup d'état (May 27), the Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes 
along with his two ministers Hasan Polatkan and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu were executed by hanging.35 It is 
true that, since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the general elections in 2002 (party’s 
leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became prime minister), Turkey has moved away from its tradition of 
facing one military coup in every decade since the 1960s (excluding the July 2016 failed coup attempt 
by a fraction of the arm forces); but given Turkey’s current government’s ever more authoritarian 
rule, it is hotly debated whether the past two decades of democratic and economic developments have 
been more damaging or beneficial.36 The ruling AKP’s promise of making solid reforms left its place 
to more dictatorial/dysfunctional politics and laws that have been purposely designed to suppress 
the citizens of Turkey; consequently, once highly praised AKP (i.e. democratic progress, EU accession 
negotiations, growth in GDP and GDP per capita) is now immensely criticized.  
                                                             
29 At the time of capital levy (1942), mostly non-Muslim people (Greeks and Armenians) and Jews who converted to Islam 
had taxable wealth, but this was seen as a punitive punishment and angered these communities. Turkey was not alone, 
many European countries introduced capital levies during or after both WWI and WWII. 
30 CHP’s policies were based on Mustafa Kemal’s six principles which were also basis of Turkey’s first constitution written 
in 1937; republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and revolution.  
31 In the 1950 elections, Democrat Party (DP) won 396 of 487 seats compared with only 68 seats won by CHP. 
32 Celal Bayar, longest lived state leader (1883-1986), was Prime Minister (1937-39) and President (1950-60). On 27 May 
1960 coup, along with Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, President Celal Bayar was sent to military court which convicted 
him to life imprisonment. He was released in 1964 due to poor health and pardoned in 1966.  
33 Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was arrested, prosecuted and sentenced to death. Menderes did not do anything unlawful 
to deserve the death penalty. Many years later, the Turkish government apologized for its decision. 
34 The military coup of 1960 marked the IMF rein on Turkey’s economy. There were two more coups in 1971 and 1980, and 
the most recent coup attempt on July 15, 2016 by a fraction of the Turkish Armed Forces. 
35 At the time of writing this article, the Turkish Parliament on 23 June 2020 unanimously passed a bill to make the Yassiada 
trials and the related decisions void; however, declaring the event and the decisions taken in 1960 invalid will neither 
undo the history nor will it remove the shameful stain deeply engraved in Turkey’s premature democracy.  
36 https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-rise-and-fall-of-liberal-democracy-in-turkey-implications-for-the-west/ 
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There have been numerous endogenous (internal) and exogenous (external) factors that contributed 
to Turkey’s backslide on democracy, i.e. due to acrimonious relations with European and the Middle 
Eastern neighbors (especially since Prime Minister Erdoğan walked off the stage at the 2009 Davos 
summit over clash in Gaza and accused Israeli President Shimon Peres and his country for engaging 
in inhumane treatment of Palestinians), all of the democratic gains achieved early on have vanished 
completely (see Table 3 for a brief history of unprecedented events in Turkey). Table 6 illustrates a 
list of internal and external factors that have contributed to Turkey’s democratic regression.  
 
Table 6: Internal and external factors for Turkey’s backsliding on democracy 
Endogenous – internal factors37 Exogenous – external factors 
 Chronic deficits; budget, current account, trade. 
 High inflation, interest rates, and weak currency. 
 Political turmoil due to many coalition governments; 
four between 1973 and 1980 and seven 1991 and 2002.  
Only four single-party governments; Democratic Party 
(1950-1960), Justice Party (1965-1971), Motherland 
Party (1983-1991), and Justice and Development Party 
(2002-present); most dictatorial/authoritarian so far. 
 Repeated military coup d'état and memorandum; 1960, 
1971, 1980, 1997, and 2016. 
 Negative developments; rule of law, human rights, basic 
fundamentals, and the Judiciary/legal system. 
 Turkey’s cross-border military operations in Syria, Iraq, 
Libya, and counter-terrorism against PKK. 
 Fast deterioration in fundamental freedoms since the 
July 15, 2016 failed coup attempt by a fraction of the arm 
forces, and an increase in detentions, dismissals, powers 
of the government through authoritarian rule. 
 Constrained civil, political, and defense rights; expanded 
powers for the police and state prosecutors. 
 Decrees issued during the state of emergency are not 
open to review; ineffective domestic legal remedy led to 
the rejection of thousands of complaints. 
 Due to administrative obstacles, still a great number of 
people are detained without indictment. 
 Countless civil society and rights-based organizations 
have been closed without any legal remedy. 
 The new presidential system centralized power in the 
hands of one man (i.e. President Erdogan). 
 The Parliament’s legislative and oversight functions 
have been severely curtailed (almost symbolic now). 
 Political polarization and marginalization of opposition 
parties (i.e. HDP) have increased significantly. 
 Democracy is exercised on an unequal basis as the media 
is hugely controlled by the AKP government. 
 The March 2019 municipal elections were annulled and 
the elected mayors were declared ineligible to run office. 
 Politicization of the public administration. 
 Geopolitical risks due to growing diplomatic tensions 
are on the rise and their negative impact on Turkish 
economy has been more significant than ever before. 
 Geopolitical conflicts Turkey has engaged in have set a 
climate of uncertainty, this has caused international 
investors to hold back investments, which are crucial 
for Turkey’s development programs. 
 Due to acrimonious relations with most neighbors 
(especially with the U.S.), democratic gains achieved 
for the past two decades (since 2002) have eroded, the 
hindered economic growth left its place to contraction, 
and EU accession negotiations are ground to a halt. 
 Unstable geopolitical situation in Syria, Iraq, and Iran 
forced nearly 4 million refugees to migrate to Turkey, 
which put immense pressures on its already fragile 
economy; the government claims that it has spent over 
$40 billion on refugees. 
 The EU suspended the opening of eight chapters on 
Customs Union (Dec. 2006); the negotiations will not 
resume until Turkey opens its ports (sea and air) to 
Greek-Cypriot traffic. 
 Turkey-Cyprus relations were severely strained when 
France and Cyprus unilaterally blocked chapters, and 
in December 2009, Cyprus vetoed the opening of the 
chapter 15 related to energy.  
 Massive costs of the coronavirus crisis will surge with 
the potential second or third wave of the COVID-19 
insurgence (i.e. the cost could be $50 billion). 
 Arrest, prosecution and conviction of the U.S. pastor 
Andrew Brunson of terrorism related charges and 
taking part in the 2016 failed coup attempt 
 A massive financial tsunami (currency crisis) hit 
Turkish economy (Aug. 2018), lira depreciated more 
than 50% against major currencies. 
 All economic indicators in Turkey have recorded their 
worst levels. Turkish economy is forecast to contract -
3% or more in 2020. While no IMF in Turkey’s future, 
a severe economic crisis is imminent.   
Source: Author 
                                                             
37 Commission Staff Working Document: Turkey 2019 Report. European Commission, Brussels, 29.5.2019, SWD(2019) 220 
final (Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 2019 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy. COM (2019) 260 final).   




The World Economic Forum (WEF) defines global competitiveness as “the set of institutions, policies, 
and factors that determine the level of productivity of an economy, which in turn sets the level of 
prosperity that the economy can achieve”. A wide spectrum of ways a country’s competitiveness is 
measured, but analyses in this study are based on the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) published 
by the WEF annually, which tracks 114 indicators grouped into 12 pillars (see Figure 5) that are then 
organized into three sub-indexes (see Table 7); (1) basic requirements; (2) efficiency enhancers; (3) 
innovation/sophistication factors. The GCI includes statistical data from multilateral organizations 
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, UNESCO, World Health Organization 
(WHO), and International Telecommunication Union (ITU). The WEF underlines that each nation 
provides own data (i) as is, as available; (ii) makes no representation to the accuracy of the data; and 
(iii) accepts no liability for any use of the data or any decisions or actions based on it. 
 
 
Source: World Economic Forum (WEF); https://www.weforum.org/ 
Figure 5: Global competitiveness index pillars 
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Table 7: List of variables and sample data points 
Sub-index Pillars Definition Data Points 
 GCIOR Global Competitiveness Index Overall Rank 114 
    
BR  Basic Requirements 45 
 BRINS Institutions 21 
 BRINF Infrastructure 9 
 BRMEE Macroeconomic environment 5 
 BRHPE Health and primary education 10 
    
EE  Efficiency Enhancers 53 
 EEHET Higher education and training 8 
 EEGME Goods market efficiency 16 
 EELME Labor market efficiency 10 
 EEFMD Financial market development 8 
 EETRD Technological readiness 7 
 EEMAS Market size 4 
    
IS  Innovation and Sophistication Factors 16 
 ISBUS Business sophistication 9 
 ISINN Innovation 7 
  Total Data Points 114 
Source: World Economic Forum (WEF); https://www.weforum.org/  
3.1 Research Sample 
The World Economic Forum does not compile the country-specific data employed to calculate country 
scores for the purpose of its GCI report; various parties within each country compile the data and then 
provide it to the WEF; however, for some data the WEF may be the source. For our analyses purposes 
throughout the study, we have extracted GCI data for 32 nations (Turkey, G19 excluding EU as a single 
economy38, G839, and ASEAN-540). The sample data for this research comprised 114 rankings per year 
for ten years from 2009 to 2018 (see Table 7); a total of 1,140 rankings per country were analyzed; 
since the study compared GCI scores of Turkey with those of G19, G8, and ASEAN-5 countries, thus 
the final sample size was 36,480 (i.e. 114 x 32) ranking points grouped into 12 pillars. 
3.2 Data Processing  
After the data collection was completed, the data was subject to data screening. There was no missing 
data, therefore no missing data imputation was necessary. Next, univariate and multivariate outliers 
were investigated using Z-score and Mahalanobis D2 values. Because there were no extreme outliers 
                                                             
38 G19: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea Republic, Mexico, 
Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States. 
39 G8: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States. 
40 ASEAN-5: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. 
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based on Z-scores with greater than 4 and significant Mahalanobis D2, no record was eliminated. The 
final sample size was 340.  
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
The summary of the descriptive statistics of the variables is presented in Table 8.  The results showed 
that the mean value of GCIOR was 27.22 ± 23.26, BR was 33.32 ±, 28.37, EE was 26.18 ± 20.84, and IS 
was 26.71 ±. 22.49. The summary statistics of the twelve-pillars were also included in the table.  
 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GCIOR 27.22 23.26 1 106 
BR 33.32 28.37 1 110 
BRINS 41.13 36.88 1 143 
BRINF 31.14 26.90 1 105 
BRMEE 46.57 35.46 1 138 
BRHPE 37.38 33.06 1 135 
EE 26.18 20.84 1 97 
EEHET 31.91 26.48 1 93 
EEGME 37.41 34.40 1 145 
EELME 49.56 42.27 1 144 
EEFMD 38.51 34.65 1 133 
EETRD 34.57 29.27 1 121 
EEMAS 24.20 22.94 1 130 
IS 26.71 22.49 1 108 
ISBUS 26.42 22.77 1 119 
ISINN 28.21 24.24 1 111 
Source: Author 
3.3 Panel data analysis 
This section employed country-year panel data. Initially, the proposed hypothesis were tested using 
the panel data regression analysis through models are shown below. Before attempting the analysis, 
the multicollinearity issue was tested. Due to the expected high multicollinearity among independent 
variables, the independent variables were not included in the regression analysis simultaneously. The 
variance inflation factor (VIF) values of the models ranges between 1.14 and 6.44 which are far below 
than the threshold value of 10. As a result, there were no multicollinearity between the independent 
variables. The proposed models are listed below, the objective is to determine;   
Model 1: GCIORit = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1BRit + 𝛽2EEit + 𝛽3ISit + ε 
Model 2: GCIORit = 𝛽0 +𝛽1BRINSit +𝛽2BRINFit + 𝛽3BRMEEit + ε 
Model 3: GCIORit = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1EEHETit + 𝛽2EEGMEit + 𝛽3EELMEit + 𝛽4EETRDit+ 𝛽5EEMASit+ ε 
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Model 4: GCIORit = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1ISBUSit + 𝛽2ISINNit+ ε 
 
Table 9: Fixed –Effects model panel data analysis 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Independent variables GCIOR GCIOR GCIOR GCIOR 
BR 0.37***    
 (16.90)    
     
EE 0.24***    
 (7.66)    
     
IS 0.45***    
 (17.12)    
     
BRINS  0.34***   
  (14.07)   
     
BRINF  0.25***   
  (7.15)   
     
BRMEE  0.092***   
  (7.75)   
     
BRHPE  0.12***   
  (3.92)   
     
EEHET   0.19***  
   (4.91)  
     
EEGME   0.21***  
   (6.24)  
     
EELME   0.022  
   (0.97)  
     
EEFMD   0.14***  
   (6.55)  
     
EETRD   -0.018  
   (-0.48)  
     
EEMAS   0.15  
   (1.57)  
     
ISBUS    0.45*** 
    (11.56) 
     
ISINN    0.30*** 
    (10.12) 
     
Constant -3.45*** -3.50** 3.78 6.76*** 
 (-4.47) (-2.21) (1.51) (7.62) 
N 340 340 340 340 
Adj. R2 0.833 0.588 0.388 0.611 
F-stat 574.15*** 130.03*** 42.25*** 283.57*** 
t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Source: Author 
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To start with, the pooled OLS and Fixed-Effects (FE) model were compared using F-test. The results 
indicated the FE model to be chosen (F-test = 23.03/df= 33/303; p-value=0.001). In addition, in order 
to decide between fixed or random effects model, Hausman test was performed; the key test results 
showed that fixed effect model is the most appropriate compared to random effects model (Hausman 
test: χ2 (3): 19.52, p-value: 0.001). To eliminate the first-order serial correlation in the estimation, 
fixed-effect panel analysis with a Cochrane-Orcutt procedure on the data was employed. The results 
illustrated in Table 9 show the fixed-effects model coefficients with their corresponding t-statistics. 
The results indicated that BR, EE, and IS had a significant positive impact on GCIOR a 1% significance 
level (Model 1). In addition, the effect of four-sub-dimensions of basic requirements, which are BRINS, 
BRINF, BRMEE, and EEHET, had a significant positive association with GCIOR at 1% significance level 
(Model 2). In model 3, only EEHET, EEGME, and EEFMD have a significant positive impact on GCIOR 
while EELME and EETRD had no significant impact on GCIOR at 5% significance level. Finally, the sub-
dimension of IS (ISBUS and ISINN) were also significantly positively associated with GCIOR at 1% 
significance level based on Model 4.  
3.4 Comparison Tests 
In order to investigate whether the gap between Turkey and the countries in G8, ASEAN-5, and G19 
have widened or narrowed in terms of financial stability during 2009 - 2018, a comparison test was 
employed. In this analysis, the mean GCIOR values of Turkey were compared with those of G8, ASEAN-
5 and G19 countries using one-way ANOVA with Scheffe multiple-comparison test. 
 
Table 10: GCIOR for G8 countries and Turkey during 2009 - 2018 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Freq. ∆(Turkey-G8) 
Turkey 53.5 7.56 10 - 
Canada 12.6 2.22 10 40.9*** 
France 19.7 3.13 10 33.8*** 
Germany 5.4 1.07 10 48.1*** 
Italy 45.8 3.01 10 7.7 
Japan 8 1.49 10 45.5*** 
Russian Federation 55.3 10.68 10 -1.8 
United Kingdom 9.9 1.97 10 43.6*** 
United States 3.5 1.78 10 50*** 
Source: Author; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 by ANOVA Scheffe multiple-comparison test 
The mean GCIOR of Turkey was compared with G8 countries, the results are shown in Table 10. The 
one-way ANOVA analysis was performed in order to determine the significance of the differences 
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between Turkey and G8 countries. The table shows the key results comprising the average, standard 
deviation and the mean difference between Turkey and the G8 countries of GCIOR. Based on the 
analysis, the results indicate that Turkey’s mean GCIOR value is statistically significantly higher than 
those of Canada, Germany, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom (p < .001). Even though Turkey’s 
mean GCIOR score is higher than that of Italy, the difference is not statistically significant (p > .05). 
Finally, the mean GCIOR value of Russian Federation is a little bit higher than that of Turkey, however 
this difference is also not statistically significant (p > .05).   
 
Table 11: GCIOR for ASEAN-5 countries and Turkey during 2009 - 2018 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Freq. ∆(Turkey-ASEAN5) 
Turkey 53.5 7.56 10 - 
Indonesia 43.5 7.58 10 10 
Malaysia 22.7 2.58 10 30.8*** 
Philippines 65.4 13.71 10 -11.9** 
Singapore 2.6 0.97 10 50.9*** 
Thailand 35.1 2.88 10 18.4*** 
Source: Author; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 by ANOVA Scheffe multiple-comparison test 
Similarly, Table 11 shows the comparison test results of mean GCICOR based on one-way ANOVA 
between ASEAN-5 countries and Turkey. The results indicate that the mean GCIOR value of Turkey is 
statistically significantly higher those of Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand at 1% significance level. 
Furthermore, Philippines’ mean GCIOR value is statistically significantly higher than that of Turkey at 
5% significance level. Although Turkey’s mean GCIOR values are higher than that of Indonesia, but 
this difference is not statistically significant (p-value > .05).  
Finally, the mean GCIOR value of Turkey and G19 countries were compared using one –way ANOVA 
with Scheffe multiple – comparison test. The results were presented in Table 12, which indicate that 
the mean GCIOR of Turkey is statistically significantly higher than those of Australia, Canada, China, 
France, Germany, Japan, Korea Republic, Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom, and United States (p < 0.01) 
while mean GCIOR of Argentina is statistically significantly higher than that of Turkey (p < 0.05). Even 
though the mean GCIOR of Turkey is higher than those of India, Indonesia, Italy, and South Africa, 
however the differences are not statistically significant (p > 0.05). Similarly, even though the mean 
GCIOR of Brazil, Mexico, and Russian Federation are higher than that of Turkey, but the differences 
are not significant (p > 0.05). For more detailed results of the analyses, see Figures 6, 7, and 8; plus 
more comprehensive tables with complete results are provided in the appendix. 




Figure 6: Turkey and G8 
 
 
Figure 7: Turkey and ASEAN-5 
 
 
Figure 8: Turkey and G19 
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Table 12: GCIOR for G19 countries and Turkey during 2009 - 2018  
Country Mean Std. Dev. Freq. ∆(Turkey-G19) 
Turkey 53.5 7.56 10  
Argentina 94.9 8.74 10 -41.4** 
Australia 19.6 2.46 10 33.9*** 
Brazil 62.8 11.75 10 -9.3 
Canada 12.6 2.22 10 40.9*** 
China 28.1 1.2 10 25.4*** 
France 19.7 3.13 10 33.8*** 
Germany 5.4 1.07 10 48.1*** 
India 53 9.52 10 0.5 
Indonesia 43.5 7.58 10 10 
Italy 45.8 3.01 10 7.7 
Japan 8 1.49 10 45.5*** 
Korea Rep. 22.6 4.38 10 30.9*** 
Mexico 57.2 4.8 10 -3.7 
Russian Federation 55.3 10.68 10 -1.8 
Saudi Arabia 23.9 4.68 10 29.6*** 
South Africa 51.2 5.07 10 2.3 
United Kingdom 9.9 1.97 10 43.6*** 
United States 3.5 1.78 10 50*** 
Source: Author; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 by ANOVA Scheffe multiple-comparison test 
4.0 Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
Since the day Mustafa Kemal created the Turkish Republic, Turkey has faced a constant inventory of 
instability-inflicting developments; military coup d'état in 1960 and 1980; military memorandum in 
1971, 1997, and 2007 (i.e. the Turkish military put pressure on the ruling party instead of sending its 
tanks); alleged military coup in 1993 and the latest coup d'état attempt in July 2016 by a fraction of 
the Turkish military. When there were no coup d'état or military memorandums, there were cases 
associated with coup such as Sarıkız (Blonde Girl), Ayışığı (Moonlight), Yakamoz (Phosphorescence) 
and Eldiven (Glove), Ergenekon trials (2008-16), and Operation Sledgehammer (a coup plan targeting 
the AKP – the ruling party that was founded in 2002). All of these episodes of instability not only had 
severe negative impact on the Turkish economy, but cost taxpayers billions of dollars.41  
The period of 2002-07 (Table 13) was the best time for Turkey in terms of economic growth (over 
7%) and annual GDP per capita growth (over 21%), attributable to (i) single party (non-coalition) 
AKP government; (ii) EU-accession negotiations (Table 12); and (iii) AKP’s fruitful economic stimulus 
programs. Despite Turkey’s large market size, weaknesses in quality of infrastructure and human 
resources base, and inefficient labor market have adversely affected Turkey’s growth potential. 
                                                             
41 Since the early 1980s, the Turkish military has been fighting against the designated terrorist Kurdish militant and political 
organization called the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which was founded in 1974 by Abdullah Öcalan; since 1984, 
more than 40,000 people have been killed and over $100 billion were spent.   
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Table 13: Key dates and developments as Turkey’s EU bid in limbo 
Key Dates Key Developments 
September 1959 Turkey applies for associate membership of the European Economic Community (EEC). 
September 1963 
Signature of the Association Agreement, aiming at enhancing economic cooperation and 
achieving a Customs Union between Turkey and the EEC. 
April 1987 Turkey presents its formal application for membership of the European Economic Community. 
January 1995 EU-Turkey Agreement creating a customs union. 
December 1999 The European Council recognizes Turkey as a candidate country. 
December 2004 The European Council agrees to start accession negotiations with Turkey. 
October 2005 Start of accession negotiations. 
December 2006 
The Council decides that eight negotiating chapters cannot be opened and no chapter can be 
closed until Turkey meets its obligation of full, non-discriminatory implementation of the 
additional protocol to the Association Agreement. 
May 2012 European Commission and Turkey start the implementation of the Positive agenda for Turkey. 
December 2013 
The EU-Turkey readmission agreement is signed in parallel with the launching of the visa 
liberalization dialogue. 
October 2014 The EU-Turkey readmission agreement enters into force. 
March 2015 The European Commission and Turkey launch a high-level energy dialogue. 
May 2015 
The European Commission and Turkey agree to modernize the 20-year-old Customs Union 
Agreement and to enhance EU-Turkey bilateral trade relations. 
November 2015 
On the occasion of the EU-Turkey Leaders' Meeting, both sides agree on the activation of a Joint 
Action Plan aiming at ending the irregular migration from Turkey to the EU, in full compliance 
with EU and international standards. 
December 2015 Chapter 17 on economic and monetary policy is opened. 
January 2016 The EU-Turkey high-level political dialogue and high-level energy dialogue take place. 
March 2016 
The EU and Turkey agree on a Joint Statement on the basis of the Joint Action Plan of November 
2015. 
April 2016 
The first EU-Turkey high-level economic dialogue takes place; the first Report on the 
implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016 is published. 
May 2016 
The third Report on progress by Turkey in fulfilling the requirements of its visa liberalization 
roadmap is published. 
June 2016 Chapter 33 on financial and budgetary provisions is opened. 
September 2016 The EU-Turkey high-level political dialogue takes place. 
December 2016 
The European Commission adopts a recommendation for opening of negotiations with Turkey on 
the modernization of the Customs Union. 
May 2017 EU-Turkey Leaders' meeting takes place in Brussels. 
July 2017 The EU-Turkey high-level political dialogue takes place. 
November 2017 The first high-level EU-Turkey dialogue on transport takes place. 
December 2017 The EU-Turkey high-level economic dialogue takes place. 
March 2018 EU-Turkey Leaders' meeting takes place in Varna, Bulgaria. 
April 2018 The 77th EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee takes place in Brussels. 
November 2018 The EU-Turkey high-level political dialogue takes place in Ankara. 
December 2018 The 78th EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee takes place in Ankara. 
January 2019 The EU-Turkey high-level dialogue on transport takes place in Brussels. 
February 2019 The EU-Turkey high-level economic dialogue takes place in Istanbul. 
March 2019 The 54th EU-Turkey Association Council takes place in Brussels. 
Source: European Commission; https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/news/key-findings-2019-report-turkey-9579  
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Unresolved issues of transparency and inefficiency of public institutions continue to have negative 
impact on Turkey’s sovereign rating and future growth prospects. Geopolitical risks have risen for 
Turkey since President Recep Tayip Erdoğan walked off the stage at the 2009 Davos summit over 
clash in Gaza and accused Israel for engaging in inhumane treatment of Palestinians. 
 







GDP Per Capita 
$ 
GDP P.C. Annual 
Growth % 
2007 675,010 5.0 2007 9,563 21.1 
2006 550,796 7.1 2006 7,899 8.5 
2005 501,163 9.0 2005 7,278 22.3 
2004 404,853 9.6 2004 5,953 28.2 
2003 311,944 5.6 2003 4,643 29.4 
2002 238,342 6.4 2002 3,589 17.6 
Source: Countryeconomy.com; https://countryeconomy.com/gdp/turkey 
As shown in Table 15, Turkey has dropped by 10 places in the overall rankings, making it far below 
its historical highs (the country ranked 43rd in 2012-13). Since the 2016 failed coup attempt, there 
has been a substantial rise in public’s distrust for government institutions which became increasingly 
authoritarian through dysfunctional politics and laws that have been purposely designed to suppress 
the citizens of Turkey. Furthermore, there has been a noticeable deterioration in democratic progress, 
attributable to negative developments in rule of law, human rights, and the Judiciary/legal system. 
       























Canada 10 9 10 12 14 14 15 13 15 14 
France 16 16 15 18 21 23 23 22 21 22 
Germany 7 7 5 6 6 4 5 4 5 5 
Italy 49 48 48 43 42 49 49 43 44 43 
Japan 9 8 6 9 10 9 6 6 8 9 
Russia 51 63 63 66 67 64 53 45 43 38 
UK 12 13 12 10 8 10 9 10 7 8 
US 1 2 4 5 7 5 3 3 3 2 
Turkey 63 61 61 59 43 44 45 51 55 53 
Source: World Economic Forum (WEF); https://www.weforum.org/ 
When Turkey’s Global Competitiveness Index overall rank (GCIOR) is compared with those of the G8 
countries, it is only better than Russia but significantly worse than the G7 countries’ rankings (Table 
14). As far as individual rankings for 12 pillars are concerned, Turkey has achieved 13th place out of 
140 countries for market size which was its highest ranking, ranked 47th in innovation capability, 48th   
in health, and 50th in infrastructure; ranked 116th in macro-economic stability, it’s worst (Figure 9). 




Source: World Economic Forum (WEF); https://www.weforum.org/    
Figure 9: Turkey’s global competitiveness rankings in 12 pillars 
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Economic and democratic progress and related developments are interlinked; therefore, advanced nations 
have made more progress in democracy than poor, developing, and emerging economies. We have made 
the following conclusions regarding Turkey’s backslide on competitiveness which directly or indirectly 
have contributed to Turkey’s backslide on democracy and its EU accession negotiations (Table 13). 
 
Table 16: Areas affecting Turkey’s global competitiveness  
Year/Rank Negative Developments Affecting Turkey’s Economic and Democratic Progress 
2008-09 
63rd 
Turkey’s global competitiveness was hindered by weaknesses in infrastructure, primary education, 
health care, skilled workforce, and transparency of public institutions. Due to the ruling party’s 
(AKP) increasing dictatorial/authoritarian rule and dysfunctional policies, There has been a 
significant decrease in public trust for the government. Growing concerns over financial market 
efficiency and soundness of banks contributed to Turkey’s drop by 10 places in the rankings.    
2009-10 
61st 
Turkey’s large market has benefited from strong competition and business-friendly practices 
which were underpinned by macroeconomic stability following the 2008 global financial crisis. 
However ranked 120th in efficient labor market (in this case, inefficient labor market).   
2010-11 
61st 
The Turkish economy benefited from intense local competition (15th); the infrastructure (roads, 
ports, and railroads) was improved but still needed major upgrading (ranked 56th). Inefficiencies 
in the labor market (127th) and transparency of public entities worsened considerably.    
2011-12 
59th 
Again thanks to large market (17th) and strong local competition (13th), Turkey moved up 2 places 
in the rankings. However, labor market conditions (133rd), transparency of public entities (86th), 
healthcare (75th), higher education and training continue to affect competitiveness negatively.        
2012-13 
43rd 
Turkey made the biggest leap in the rankings, moved up by 16 places from the previous year, this 
was largely attributable to Turkey’s GDP growth in 2011 (8.4%) and favorable macroeconomic 
environment. Although there was a noticeable improvement in the transparency of public entities 
(67th), the labor market inefficiencies (124th) remained to be a bottleneck. 
2013-14 
44th 
Turkey fell by one spot from its highest ranking last year owing to exogenous (macroeconomic 
instability) and endogenous (rising fiscal deficit and inflation) factors. Excluding the efficiency of 
the labor market (130th), transparency (58th) and Infrastructure (49th) improved further (49th). 
2014-15 
45th 
Turkey dropped one more place to 45th in the rankings out of 140 countries. After GDP and GDP 
per capita peaked in 2013 ($950.3 billion and $12,395 respectively), the Turkish economy has lost 
steam since then due to substantially risen geopolitical risks. Also in 2013, Turkey achieved the 
highest global competitiveness ranking of 43rd (also see Figure 10).   
2015-16 
51st 
Augmented geopolitical risks and the strained US-Turkey relations caused the country to drop six 
positions to 51st; moreover, a general decline in all 12 pillars was observed. Following the June 
2015 elections, political conflict increased. Although the transportation infrastructure (23rd) and 
goods market efficiency (45th) improved, labor market inefficiency remained very high (127th).     
2016-17 
55th 
Turkey underwent another military coup on July 15, 2016, but this time it ended up as a failed 
attempt by a fraction of the Turkish military; however, the data was collected before the event. 
About 4 million refugees from Syria put pressure on the Turkish economy (i.e. the government 
claims to have spent circa $50 billion). Week domestic competition, lack of structural reforms, and 
persistent inefficiencies in the labor market (126th) played a role in the drop of four places.    
2017-18 
53rd 
Turkey moves up two places, but still lower than its historic high ranking of 43rd in 2013. Turkey 
leads many countries in the adoption of latest technologies, broadband (high-speed internet) 
subscription has increased from 50% of the population to about 70% (i.e. more than 50 million). 











Source: World Economic Forum (WEF); https://www.weforum.org/  
Figure 10: Turkey’s global competitiveness overall rankings (2008-2018) 
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All the data contained in the Tables and Figures have been extracted from the Global Competitiveness 
Index (GCI) reports published annually by the World Economic Forum (WEF). 
   
Table A1: Turkey compared with G8 countries 
Country Year Brhpe Brinf Brins Brmee Eefmd Eegme Eehet Eelme Eemas Eetrd Isbus Isinn 
Turkey 2008 78 66 80 79 76 55 72 125 15 58 60 66 
Turkey 2009 74 62 96 64 80 56 73 120 15 54 52 69 
Turkey 2010 72 56 88 83 61 59 71 127 16 56 52 67 
Turkey 2011 75 51 80 69 55 47 74 133 17 55 58 69 
Turkey 2012 63 51 64 55 44 38 74 124 15 53 47 55 
Turkey 2013 59 49 56 76 51 43 65 130 16 58 43 50 
Turkey 2014 69 51 64 58 58 43 50 131 16 55 50 56 
Turkey 2015 73 53 75 68 64 45 55 127 16 64 58 60 
Turkey 2016 79 48 74 54 82 52 50 126 17 67 65 71 
Turkey 2017 84 53 71 50 80 53 48 127 14 62 67 69 
Canada 2008 6 6 15 43 10 16 9 7 14 9 18 13 
Canada 2009 7 7 17 31 11 16 9 7 14 11 17 12 
Canada 2010 6 9 11 36 12 11 8 6 14 16 16 11 
Canada 2011 6 11 11 49 13 12 12 5 14 16 24 11 
Canada 2012 7 13 11 51 11 13 15 4 13 20 26 22 
Canada 2013 7 12 14 50 12 17 16 7 13 21 25 21 
Canada 2014 7 15 14 51 8 15 18 7 13 22 23 22 
Canada 2015 7 14 16 39 4 15 19 7 14 18 22 24 
Canada 2016 9 15 18 41 7 17 19 8 15 21 24 24 
Canada 2017 8 16 15 47 7 18 13 7 16 23 23 23 
France 2008 9 2 23 65 25 21 16 105 7 20 9 16 
France 2009 11 3 26 58 21 25 15 67 8 24 10 18 
France 2010 16 4 26 44 16 32 17 60 7 12 12 19 
France 2011 16 4 28 83 18 38 20 68 7 13 14 17 
France 2012 21 4 32 68 27 46 27 66 8 14 21 17 
France 2013 24 4 31 73 33 45 24 71 8 17 21 19 
France 2014 18 8 32 82 23 46 28 61 8 18 22 19 
France 2015 16 8 29 77 29 35 25 51 8 16 20 18 
France 2016 19 7 29 67 31 31 21 51 7 17 14 17 
France 2017 24 7 31 63 33 36 22 56 8 21 16 17 
Germany 2008 24 1 14 40 19 15 21 58 4 18 1 8 
Germany 2009 24 1 16 30 36 18 22 70 5 12 2 7 
Germany 2010 25 2 13 23 36 21 19 70 5 10 3 8 
Germany 2011 23 2 19 30 39 26 7 64 5 14 4 7 
Germany 2012 22 3 16 30 32 21 5 53 5 15 3 7 
Germany 2013 21 3 15 27 29 21 3 41 5 14 3 4 
Germany 2014 14 7 17 24 25 19 16 35 5 13 3 6 
Germany 2015 13 7 20 20 18 23 17 28 5 12 3 6 
Germany 2016 14 8 22 15 20 23 16 22 5 10 3 5 
Germany 2017 13 10 21 12 12 11 15 14 5 8 5 5 
Italy 2008 30 54 84 100 91 62 44 126 9 31 21 53 
Italy 2009 27 59 97 102 100 65 49 117 9 39 20 50 
Italy 2010 26 31 92 76 101 68 47 118 9 43 23 50 
Italy 2011 20 32 88 92 97 59 41 123 9 42 26 43 
Italy 2012 25 28 97 102 111 65 45 127 10 40 28 36 
Italy 2013 26 25 102 101 124 87 42 137 10 37 27 38 
Italy 2014 22 26 106 108 119 73 47 136 12 38 25 35 
Italy 2015 26 26 106 111 117 71 45 126 12 37 24 32 
Italy 2016 23 25 103 98 127 67 43 119 12 40 25 32 
Italy 2017 25 27 95 96 126 60 41 116 12 41 25 34 
Japan 2008 22 11 26 98 42 18 23 11 3 21 3 4 
Japan 2009 19 13 28 97 61 41 69 75 16 88 1 4 
Japan 2010 9 11 25 105 39 17 20 13 3 28 1 4 
Japan 2011 9 15 24 113 32 18 19 12 4 25 1 4 
Japan 2012 10 11 22 124 36 20 21 20 4 16 1 5 
Japan 2013 10 9 17 127 23 16 21 23 4 19 1 5 
Japan 2014 6 6 11 127 16 12 21 22 4 20 1 4 
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Japan 2015 4 5 13 121 19 11 21 21 4 19 2 5 
Japan 2016 5 5 16 104 17 16 23 19 4 19 2 8 
Japan 2017 7 4 17 93 20 13 23 22 4 15 3 8 
Russian Federation 2008 59 59 110 29 112 99 46 27 8 67 91 48 
Russian Federation 2009 51 71 114 36 119 108 51 43 7 74 95 51 
Russian Federation 2010 53 47 118 79 125 123 50 57 8 69 101 57 
Russian Federation 2011 68 48 128 44 127 128 52 65 8 68 114 71 
Russian Federation 2012 65 47 133 22 130 134 52 84 7 57 119 85 
Russian Federation 2013 71 45 121 19 121 126 47 72 7 59 107 78 
Russian Federation 2014 56 39 97 31 110 99 39 45 7 59 86 65 
Russian Federation 2015 56 35 100 40 95 92 38 50 6 60 80 68 
Russian Federation 2016 62 35 88 91 108 87 32 49 6 62 72 56 
Russian Federation 2017 54 35 83 53 107 80 32 60 6 57 71 49 
United Kingdom 2008 19 18 25 58 5 19 18 8 6 8 17 17 
United Kingdom 2009 23 20 21 71 24 20 18 8 6 8 12 15 
United Kingdom 2010 19 8 17 56 25 22 18 8 6 8 9 14 
United Kingdom 2011 14 6 15 85 20 19 16 7 6 8 8 13 
United Kingdom 2012 17 6 13 110 13 17 16 5 6 7 8 10 
United Kingdom 2013 16 8 12 115 15 14 17 5 6 4 9 12 
United Kingdom 2014 21 10 12 107 15 13 19 5 6 2 6 12 
United Kingdom 2015 18 9 14 108 16 12 18 5 9 3 6 12 
United Kingdom 2016 17 9 14 85 16 9 20 5 9 3 7 13 
United Kingdom 2017 17 11 12 68 13 10 20 6 7 4 7 12 
United States 2008 34 7 29 66 9 8 5 1 1 11 4 1 
United States 2009 36 8 34 93 20 12 7 3 1 13 5 1 
United States 2010 42 15 40 87 31 26 9 4 1 17 8 1 
United States 2011 42 16 39 90 22 24 13 4 1 20 10 5 
United States 2012 34 14 41 111 16 23 8 6 1 11 10 6 
United States 2013 34 15 35 117 10 20 7 4 1 15 6 7 
United States 2014 49 12 30 113 9 16 7 4 1 16 4 5 
United States 2015 46 11 28 96 5 16 6 4 2 17 4 4 
United States 2016 39 11 27 71 3 14 8 4 2 14 4 4 
United States 2017 29 9 20 83 2 7 3 3 2 6 2 2 
 
Table A2: Turkey compared with ASEAN-5 countries 
Country Year Brhpe Brinf Brins Brmee Eefmd Eegme Eehet Eelme Eemas Eetrd Isbus Isinn 
Turkey 2008 78 66 80 79 76 55 72 125 15 58 60 66 
Turkey 2009 74 62 96 64 80 56 73 120 15 54 52 69 
Turkey 2010 72 56 88 83 61 59 71 127 16 56 52 67 
Turkey 2011 75 51 80 69 55 47 74 133 17 55 58 69 
Turkey 2012 63 51 64 55 44 38 74 124 15 53 47 55 
Turkey 2013 59 49 56 76 51 43 65 130 16 58 43 50 
Turkey 2014 69 51 64 58 58 43 50 131 16 55 50 56 
Turkey 2015 73 53 75 68 64 45 55 127 16 64 58 60 
Turkey 2016 79 48 74 54 82 52 50 126 17 67 65 71 
Turkey 2017 84 53 71 50 80 53 48 127 14 62 67 69 
Indonesia 2008 87 86 68 72 57 37 71 43 17 88 39 47 
Indonesia 2009 82 84 58 52 61 41 69 75 16 88 40 39 
Indonesia 2010 62 82 61 35 62 49 66 84 15 91 37 36 
Indonesia 2011 64 76 71 23 69 67 69 94 15 94 45 36 
Indonesia 2012 70 78 72 25 70 63 73 120 16 85 42 39 
Indonesia 2013 72 61 67 26 60 50 64 103 15 75 37 33 
Indonesia 2014 74 56 53 34 42 48 61 110 15 77 34 31 
Indonesia 2015 80 62 55 33 49 55 65 115 10 85 36 30 
Indonesia 2016 100 60 56 30 42 58 63 108 10 91 39 31 
Indonesia 2017 94 52 47 26 37 43 64 96 9 80 32 31 
Malaysia 2008 23 23 30 38 16 23 35 18 28 34 22 22 
Malaysia 2009 34 26 43 42 6 30 41 31 28 37 24 24 
Malaysia 2010 34 30 42 41 7 27 49 35 29 40 25 24 
Malaysia 2011 33 26 30 29 3 15 38 20 29 44 20 24 
Malaysia 2012 33 32 29 35 6 11 39 24 28 51 20 25 
Malaysia 2013 33 29 29 38 6 10 46 25 26 51 20 25 
Malaysia 2014 33 25 20 44 4 7 46 19 26 60 15 21 
Malaysia 2015 24 24 23 35 9 6 36 19 26 47 13 20 
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Malaysia 2016 44 24 26 35 13 12 41 24 24 43 20 22 
Malaysia 2017 30 22 27 34 16 20 45 26 24 46 20 22 
Philippines 2008 90 92 105 53 78 81 60 101 34 70 57 76 
Philippines 2009 93 98 113 76 93 95 68 113 35 84 65 99 
Philippines 2010 90 104 125 68 75 97 73 111 37 95 60 111 
Philippines 2011 92 105 117 54 71 88 71 113 36 83 57 108 
Philippines 2012 98 98 94 36 58 86 64 103 35 79 49 94 
Philippines 2013 96 96 79 40 48 82 67 100 33 77 49 69 
Philippines 2014 92 91 67 26 49 70 64 91 35 69 46 52 
Philippines 2015 86 90 77 24 48 80 63 82 30 68 42 48 
Philippines 2016 81 95 91 20 48 99 58 86 31 83 52 62 
Philippines 2017 82 97 94 22 52 103 55 84 27 83 58 65 
Singapore 2008 16 4 1 21 2 1 8 2 41 7 14 11 
Singapore 2009 13 4 1 35 2 1 5 1 39 6 14 8 
Singapore 2010 3 5 1 33 2 1 5 1 41 11 15 19 
Singapore 2011 3 3 1 9 1 1 4 2 37 10 15 8 
Singapore 2012 3 2 1 17 2 1 2 2 37 5 14 8 
Singapore 2013 2 2 3 18 2 1 2 1 34 7 17 9 
Singapore 2014 3 2 3 15 2 1 2 2 31 7 19 9 
Singapore 2015 2 2 2 12 2 1 1 2 35 5 18 9 
Singapore 2016 2 2 2 11 2 1 1 2 37 9 19 9 
Singapore 2017 3 2 2 18 3 1 1 2 35 14 18 9 
Thailand 2008 58 29 57 41 49 46 51 13 21 66 46 54 
Thailand 2009 61 40 60 22 49 44 54 25 21 63 43 57 
Thailand 2010 80 35 64 46 51 41 59 24 23 68 48 52 
Thailand 2011 83 42 67 28 50 42 62 30 22 84 47 54 
Thailand 2012 78 46 77 27 43 37 60 76 22 84 46 68 
Thailand 2013 81 47 78 31 32 34 66 62 22 78 40 66 
Thailand 2014 66 48 84 19 34 30 59 66 22 65 41 67 
Thailand 2015 67 44 82 27 39 30 56 67 18 58 35 57 
Thailand 2016 86 49 84 13 39 37 62 71 18 63 43 54 
Thailand 2017 90 43 78 9 40 33 57 65 18 61 42 50 
 
Table A3: Turkey compared with G19 countries 
Country Year Brhpe Brinf Brins Brmee Eefmd Eegme Eehet Eelme Eemas Eetrd Isbus Isinn 
Turkey 2008 78 66 80 79 76 55 72 125 15 58 60 66 
Turkey 2009 74 62 96 64 80 56 73 120 15 54 52 69 
Turkey 2010 72 56 88 83 61 59 71 127 16 56 52 67 
Turkey 2011 75 51 80 69 55 47 74 133 17 55 58 69 
Turkey 2012 63 51 64 55 44 38 74 124 15 53 47 55 
Turkey 2013 59 49 56 76 51 43 65 130 16 58 43 50 
Turkey 2014 69 51 64 58 58 43 50 131 16 55 50 56 
Turkey 2015 73 53 75 68 64 45 55 127 16 64 58 60 
Turkey 2016 79 48 74 54 82 52 50 126 17 67 65 71 
Turkey 2017 84 53 71 50 80 53 48 127 14 62 67 69 
Canada 2008 6 6 15 43 10 16 9 7 14 9 18 13 
Canada 2009 7 7 17 31 11 16 9 7 14 11 17 12 
Canada 2010 6 9 11 36 12 11 8 6 14 16 16 11 
Canada 2011 6 11 11 49 13 12 12 5 14 16 24 11 
Canada 2012 7 13 11 51 11 13 15 4 13 20 26 22 
Canada 2013 7 12 14 50 12 17 16 7 13 21 25 21 
Canada 2014 7 15 14 51 8 15 18 7 13 22 23 22 
Canada 2015 7 14 16 39 4 15 19 7 14 18 22 24 
Canada 2016 9 15 18 41 7 17 19 8 15 21 24 24 
Canada 2017 8 16 15 47 7 18 13 7 16 23 23 23 
France 2008 9 2 23 65 25 21 16 105 7 20 9 16 
France 2009 11 3 26 58 21 25 15 67 8 24 10 18 
France 2010 16 4 26 44 16 32 17 60 7 12 12 19 
France 2011 16 4 28 83 18 38 20 68 7 13 14 17 
France 2012 21 4 32 68 27 46 27 66 8 14 21 17 
France 2013 24 4 31 73 33 45 24 71 8 17 21 19 
France 2014 18 8 32 82 23 46 28 61 8 18 22 19 
France 2015 16 8 29 77 29 35 25 51 8 16 20 18 
France 2016 19 7 29 67 31 31 21 51 7 17 14 17 
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France 2017 24 7 31 63 33 36 22 56 8 21 16 17 
Germany 2008 24 1 14 40 19 15 21 58 4 18 1 8 
Germany 2009 24 1 16 30 36 18 22 70 5 12 2 7 
Germany 2010 25 2 13 23 36 21 19 70 5 10 3 8 
Germany 2011 23 2 19 30 39 26 7 64 5 14 4 7 
Germany 2012 22 3 16 30 32 21 5 53 5 15 3 7 
Germany 2013 21 3 15 27 29 21 3 41 5 14 3 4 
Germany 2014 14 7 17 24 25 19 16 35 5 13 3 6 
Germany 2015 13 7 20 20 18 23 17 28 5 12 3 6 
Germany 2016 14 8 22 15 20 23 16 22 5 10 3 5 
Germany 2017 13 10 21 12 12 11 15 14 5 8 5 5 
Italy 2008 30 54 84 100 91 62 44 126 9 31 21 53 
Italy 2009 27 59 97 102 100 65 49 117 9 39 20 50 
Italy 2010 26 31 92 76 101 68 47 118 9 43 23 50 
Italy 2011 20 32 88 92 97 59 41 123 9 42 26 43 
Italy 2012 25 28 97 102 111 65 45 127 10 40 28 36 
Italy 2013 26 25 102 101 124 87 42 137 10 37 27 38 
Italy 2014 22 26 106 108 119 73 47 136 12 38 25 35 
Italy 2015 26 26 106 111 117 71 45 126 12 37 24 32 
Italy 2016 23 25 103 98 127 67 43 119 12 40 25 32 
Italy 2017 25 27 95 96 126 60 41 116 12 41 25 34 
Japan 2008 22 11 26 98 42 18 23 11 3 21 3 4 
Japan 2009 19 13 28 97 61 41 69 75 16 88 1 4 
Japan 2010 9 11 25 105 39 17 20 13 3 28 1 4 
Japan 2011 9 15 24 113 32 18 19 12 4 25 1 4 
Japan 2012 10 11 22 124 36 20 21 20 4 16 1 5 
Japan 2013 10 9 17 127 23 16 21 23 4 19 1 5 
Japan 2014 6 6 11 127 16 12 21 22 4 20 1 4 
Japan 2015 4 5 13 121 19 11 21 21 4 19 2 5 
Japan 2016 5 5 16 104 17 16 23 19 4 19 2 8 
Japan 2017 7 4 17 93 20 13 23 22 4 15 3 8 
Russian Federation 2008 59 59 110 29 112 99 46 27 8 67 91 48 
Russian Federation 2009 51 71 114 36 119 108 51 43 7 74 95 51 
Russian Federation 2010 53 47 118 79 125 123 50 57 8 69 101 57 
Russian Federation 2011 68 48 128 44 127 128 52 65 8 68 114 71 
Russian Federation 2012 65 47 133 22 130 134 52 84 7 57 119 85 
Russian Federation 2013 71 45 121 19 121 126 47 72 7 59 107 78 
Russian Federation 2014 56 39 97 31 110 99 39 45 7 59 86 65 
Russian Federation 2015 56 35 100 40 95 92 38 50 6 60 80 68 
Russian Federation 2016 62 35 88 91 108 87 32 49 6 62 72 56 
Russian Federation 2017 54 35 83 53 107 80 32 60 6 57 71 49 
United Kingdom 2008 19 18 25 58 5 19 18 8 6 8 17 17 
United Kingdom 2009 23 20 21 71 24 20 18 8 6 8 12 15 
United Kingdom 2010 19 8 17 56 25 22 18 8 6 8 9 14 
United Kingdom 2011 14 6 15 85 20 19 16 7 6 8 8 13 
United Kingdom 2012 17 6 13 110 13 17 16 5 6 7 8 10 
United Kingdom 2013 16 8 12 115 15 14 17 5 6 4 9 12 
United Kingdom 2014 21 10 12 107 15 13 19 5 6 2 6 12 
United Kingdom 2015 18 9 14 108 16 12 18 5 9 3 6 12 
United Kingdom 2016 17 9 14 85 16 9 20 5 9 3 7 13 
United Kingdom 2017 17 11 12 68 13 10 20 6 7 4 7 12 
United States 2008 34 7 29 66 9 8 5 1 1 11 4 1 
United States 2009 36 8 34 93 20 12 7 3 1 13 5 1 
United States 2010 42 15 40 87 31 26 9 4 1 17 8 1 
United States 2011 42 16 39 90 22 24 13 4 1 20 10 5 
United States 2012 34 14 41 111 16 23 8 6 1 11 10 6 
United States 2013 34 15 35 117 10 20 7 4 1 15 6 7 
United States 2014 49 12 30 113 9 16 7 4 1 16 4 5 
United States 2015 46 11 28 96 5 16 6 4 2 17 4 4 
United States 2016 39 11 27 71 3 14 8 4 2 14 4 4 
United States 2017 29 9 20 83 2 7 3 3 2 6 2 2 
Argentina 2008 61 87 128 64 117 122 56 130 24 76 71 98 
Argentina 2009 59 88 126 48 116 124 55 123 23 68 73 86 
Argentina 2010 60 77 132 54 126 135 55 128 24 73 75 73 
Argentina 2011 56 81 134 62 126 137 54 131 24 64 79 78 
Argentina 2012 59 86 138 94 131 140 53 140 23 67 89 91 
Argentina 2013 61 89 143 111 133 145 49 144 24 88 95 104 
Argentina 2014 67 89 137 102 129 141 45 143 24 82 96 97 
Argentina 2015 68 87 135 114 132 138 39 139 27 69 101 93 
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Argentina 2016 63 85 130 130 127 135 40 130 28 69 88 81 
Argentina 2017 64 81 113 125 121 133 38 132 32 66 78 72 
Australia 2008 15 21 12 28 6 10 14 9 19 19 26 20 
Australia 2009 16 25 12 18 4 9 14 9 19 20 26 20 
Australia 2010 13 22 14 17 3 18 14 11 18 23 29 21 
Australia 2011 10 24 13 26 6 22 11 13 19 22 29 22 
Australia 2012 13 18 18 26 8 24 11 42 21 19 30 23 
Australia 2013 22 18 23 25 7 31 15 54 18 12 30 22 
Australia 2014 17 20 19 30 6 29 11 56 18 19 28 25 
Australia 2015 9 16 19 28 7 27 8 36 22 21 27 23 
Australia 2016 10 17 19 23 6 27 9 28 22 24 28 26 
Australia 2017 12 28 18 27 6 28 9 28 22 27 28 27 
Brazil 2008 79 78 91 122 64 101 58 91 10 56 35 43 
Brazil 2009 79 74 93 109 51 99 58 80 10 46 32 43 
Brazil 2010 87 62 93 111 50 114 58 96 10 54 31 42 
Brazil 2011 87 64 77 115 43 113 57 83 10 54 31 44 
Brazil 2012 88 70 79 62 46 104 66 69 9 48 33 49 
Brazil 2013 89 71 80 75 50 123 72 92 9 55 39 55 
Brazil 2014 77 76 94 85 53 123 41 109 9 58 47 62 
Brazil 2015 103 74 121 117 58 128 93 122 7 54 56 84 
Brazil 2016 99 72 120 126 93 128 84 117 8 59 63 100 
Brazil 2017 96 73 109 124 92 122 79 114 10 55 56 85 
China 2008 50 47 56 11 109 51 64 51 2 77 43 28 
China 2009 45 46 48 8 81 42 61 32 2 79 38 26 
China 2010 37 50 49 4 57 43 60 38 2 78 41 26 
China 2011 32 44 48 10 48 45 58 36 2 77 37 29 
China 2012 35 48 50 11 54 59 62 41 2 88 45 33 
China 2013 40 48 47 10 54 61 70 34 2 85 45 32 
China 2014 46 46 47 10 54 56 65 37 2 83 43 32 
China 2015 44 39 51 8 54 58 68 37 1 74 38 31 
China 2016 41 42 45 8 56 56 54 39 1 74 34 30 
China 2017 40 46 41 17 48 46 47 38 1 73 33 28 
India 2008 100 72 53 109 34 47 63 89 5 69 27 32 
India 2009 101 76 54 96 16 48 66 83 4 83 27 30 
India 2010 104 86 58 73 17 71 85 92 4 86 44 39 
India 2011 101 89 69 105 21 70 87 81 3 93 43 38 
India 2012 101 84 70 99 21 75 86 82 3 96 40 41 
India 2013 102 85 72 110 19 85 91 99 3 98 42 41 
India 2014 98 87 70 101 51 95 93 112 3 121 57 49 
India 2015 84 81 60 91 53 91 90 103 3 120 52 42 
India 2016 85 68 42 75 38 60 81 84 3 110 35 29 
India 2017 91 66 39 80 42 56 75 75 3 107 39 29 
Indonesia 2008 87 86 68 72 57 37 71 43 17 88 39 47 
Indonesia 2009 82 84 58 52 61 41 69 75 16 88 40 39 
Indonesia 2010 62 82 61 35 62 49 66 84 15 91 37 36 
Indonesia 2011 64 76 71 23 69 67 69 94 15 94 45 36 
Indonesia 2012 70 78 72 25 70 63 73 120 16 85 42 39 
Indonesia 2013 72 61 67 26 60 50 64 103 15 75 37 33 
Indonesia 2014 74 56 53 34 42 48 61 110 15 77 34 31 
Indonesia 2015 80 62 55 33 49 55 65 115 10 85 36 30 
Indonesia 2016 100 60 56 30 42 58 63 108 10 91 39 31 
Indonesia 2017 94 52 47 26 37 43 64 96 9 80 32 31 
Korea Rep. 2008 26 15 28 4 37 22 12 41 13 13 16 9 
Korea Rep. 2009 27 17 53 11 58 36 16 84 12 15 21 11 
Korea Rep. 2010 21 18 62 6 83 38 15 78 11 19 24 12 
Korea Rep. 2011 15 9 65 6 80 37 17 76 11 18 25 14 
Korea Rep. 2012 11 9 62 10 71 29 17 73 11 18 22 16 
Korea Rep. 2013 18 11 74 9 81 33 19 78 12 22 24 17 
Korea Rep. 2014 27 14 82 7 80 33 23 86 11 25 27 17 
Korea Rep. 2015 23 13 69 5 87 26 23 83 13 27 26 19 
Korea Rep. 2016 29 10 63 3 80 24 25 77 13 28 23 20 
Korea Rep. 2017 28 8 58 2 74 24 25 73 13 29 26 18 
Mexico 2008 65 68 97 48 66 73 74 110 11 71 58 90 
Mexico 2009 65 69 98 28 73 90 74 115 11 71 62 78 
Mexico 2010 70 75 106 28 96 96 79 120 12 71 67 78 
Mexico 2011 69 66 103 39 83 84 72 114 12 63 56 63 
Mexico 2012 68 68 92 40 61 79 77 102 12 72 44 56 
Mexico 2013 73 64 96 49 59 83 85 113 11 74 55 61 
Mexico 2014 71 65 102 53 63 86 87 121 10 79 58 61 
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Mexico 2015 71 59 109 56 46 82 86 114 11 73 50 59 
Mexico 2016 74 57 116 51 35 70 82 105 11 73 45 55 
Mexico 2017 76 62 123 43 36 70 80 105 11 71 49 56 
Saudi Arabia 2008 51 41 34 9 73 34 53 63 22 51 41 34 
Saudi Arabia 2009 71 36 32 9 53 29 53 71 22 44 35 32 
Saudi Arabia 2010 74 28 21 22 22 10 51 66 22 42 19 28 
Saudi Arabia 2011 61 25 12 12 16 4 36 50 23 43 17 26 
Saudi Arabia 2012 58 26 15 6 22 14 40 59 24 35 25 29 
Saudi Arabia 2013 53 31 20 4 27 27 48 70 23 41 28 30 
Saudi Arabia 2014 50 30 25 4 30 35 57 64 20 45 30 33 
Saudi Arabia 2015 49 30 24 4 41 29 49 60 17 42 29 34 
Saudi Arabia 2016 51 31 24 68 47 41 46 65 14 41 31 42 
Saudi Arabia 2017 51 29 26 58 56 42 43 80 15 44 34 40 
South Africa 2008 122 48 46 63 24 31 57 88 23 49 33 37 
South Africa 2009 125 45 45 68 5 35 65 90 24 65 36 41 
South Africa 2010 129 63 47 43 9 40 75 97 25 76 38 44 
South Africa 2011 131 62 46 55 4 32 73 95 25 76 38 41 
South Africa 2012 132 63 43 69 3 32 84 113 25 62 38 42 
South Africa 2013 135 66 41 95 3 28 89 116 25 62 35 39 
South Africa 2014 132 60 36 89 7 32 86 113 25 66 31 43 
South Africa 2015 126 68 38 85 12 38 83 107 29 50 33 38 
South Africa 2016 123 64 40 79 11 28 77 97 30 49 30 35 



















Figure A1: Turkey and G8 
 





Figure A2: Turkey and ASEAN-5 
Turkey and ASEAN-5 





Figure A3: Turkey and G19 
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